P/ .NT COOPERATION TREA:

From the INTERNATIONAL BUREAU

PCT

NOTIFICATION OF ELECTION

(PCT Rule 61.2)

Commissioner

US Department of Commerce United States Patent and Trademark

Office, PCT

2011 South Clark Place Room 524

Arlington, VA 22202 ETATS-UNIS D'AMERIQUE ETATS-UNIS D'AMERIQUE

Date of mailing (day/month/year) 26 October 2000 (26.10.00)

in its capacity as elected Office

Applicant's or agent's file reference International application No. 30990050 WO PCT/GB00/00528 Priority date (day/month/year) International filing date (day/month/year) 15 February 2000 (15.02.00) 15 February 1999 (15.02.99) Applicant

PROUDLER, Graeme, John et al

1.	The designated Office is hereby notified of its election made:
	$\overline{\mathbf{X}}$ in the demand filed with the International Preliminary Examining Authority on:
	15 September 2000 (15.09.00)
	in a notice effecting later election filed with the International Bureau on:
2.	The election X was
	made before the expiration of 19 months from the priority date or, where Rule 32 applies, within the time limit under Rule 32.2(b).
	•

The International Bureau of WIPO 34, chemin des Colombettes 1211 Geneva 20, Switzerland

Authorized officer

Zakaria EL KHODARY

Telephone No.: (41-22) 338.83.38

Facsimile No.: (41-22) 740.14.35 Form PCT/IB/331 (July 1992)

GB0000528

PCT

INTERNATIONAL PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION REPORT

(PCT Article 36 and Rule 70)

	icant's 90050	_	ent's file reference O	FOR FURTHER A	CTION		ation of Transmittal of International Examination Report (Form PCT/IPEA/416)			
inten	nationa	l appl	ication No.	International filing date (day/month	/year)	Priority date (day/month/year)			
PCT/GB00/00528				15/02/2000			15/02/1999			
G06	SF1/00)	ent Classification (IPC) or na		C					
	This international preliminary examination report has been prepared by this International Preliminary Examining Authority and is transmitted to the applicant according to Article 36.									
2.	This P	EPC	PRT consists of a total of	6 sheets, including this	s cover st	neet.				
	This report is also accompanied by ANNEXES, i.e. sheets of the description, claims and/or drawings which have been amended and are the basis for this report and/or sheets containing rectifications made before this Authority (see Rule 70.16 and Section 607 of the Administrative Instructions under the PCT).									
	These	ann	exes consist of a total of	sheets.						
3.	This re	eport	contains indications rela	ting to the following iter	ns:					
	1	×	Basis of the report							
	П		Priority							
	Ш		Non-establishment of o	pinion with regard to no	nion with regard to novelty, inventive step and industrial applicability					
	IV		Lack of unity of invention	n						
	٧	Ø	Reasoned statement ur citations and explanation			novelty, inve	ntive step or industrial applicability;			
	VI		Certain documents cite	ed						
	VII	\boxtimes	Certain defects in the in	ternational application						
	VIII	Ø	Certain observations or	the international appli	cation					
Date	of subr	nissio	on of the demand		Date of o	completion of	this report			
15/0	9/200	00			27.06.20	101				
		exami	g address of the international ining authority:	1	Authoriz	ed officer	STATE OF THE PARTY			
	9)	D-80	ppean Patent Office 0298 Munich +49 89 2399 - 0 Tx: 523656	epmu d	Harms	, C				
	Fax: +49 89 2399 - 4465				Telepho	ne No. +49 89	2399 7476			

PCT

REQUEST

For receiving ce use only	_
International Application No.	
International Filing Date	
Name of receiving Office and "PCT International Application"	

The undersigned requests that the present international application be processed according to the Patent Cooperation Treaty. Applicant's or agent's file reference (if desired) (12 characters maximum) 30990050 WO TITLE OF INVENTION Box No. I Trusted Computing Platform APPLICANT Box No. II Name and address: (Family name followed by given name; for a legal entity, full official designation. The address must include postal code and name of country. The country of the address indicated in this Box is the applicant's State (that is, country) of residence if no State of residence is indicated below.) This person is also inventor. Telephone No. Hewlett-Packard Company 3000 Hanover Street Facsimile No Palo Alto CA 94304 US Teleprinter No. State (that is, country) of residence: State (that is, country) of nationality: US the States indicated in the Supplemental Box the United States all designated States except the United States of America all designated This person is applicant of America only for the purposes of: Box No. III FURTHER APPLICANT(S) AND/OR (FURTHER) INVENTOR(S) Name and address: Family name followed by given name; for a legal entity, full official designation. The address must include postal code and name of country. The country of the address indicated in this Box is the applicant's State (that is, country) of residence is indicated below.) This person is: applicant only PROUDLER, Graeme John applicant and inventor 5 Touchstone Avenue Meade Park STOKE GIFFORD inventor only (If this check-box is marked, do not fill in below.) Bristol BS126XQ 8534 876 GB State (that is, country) of residence: State (that is, country) of nationality: GB GB all designated States the States indicated in the Supplemental Box the United States of America only all designated States except the United States of America This person is applicant for the purposes of: Further applicants and/or (further) inventors are indicated on a continuation sheet. AGENT OR COMMON REPRESENTATIVE; OR ADDRESS FOR CORRESPONDENCE The person identified below is hereby/has been appointed to act on behalf of the applicant(s) before the competent International Authorities as: common representative 🗶 agent Name and address: (Family name followed by given name; for a legal entity, full official designation. The address must include postal code and name of country.)

LAWRENCE, Richard Anthony Telephone No. (0)117-312-8026 **Hewlett-Packard Limited** Facsimile No. Intellectual Property Section (0)117-312-8941 Filton Road Stoke Gifford. Teleprinter No. Bristol BS34 8QZ GB Address for correspondence: Mark this check-box where no agent or common representative is/has been appointed and the space above is used instead to indicate a special address to which correspondence should be sent.

Form PCT/RO/101 (first sheet) (July 1998; reprint January 2000)

See Notes to the request form

	-	Sheet No.	2			
Continuation of Box No. III	FURT. APP	LICANT(S) AN	iD/OR (FURTI	HER) IN	VEN S)	
	e following sub-bo	xes is used, thi	s sheet should i	not be in	cluded in the	request.
Name and address: [Family nandesignation. The address must address must base is of residence is indicated the blow.] GUPTA, Dipankar 983 Sladky Ave Mountain View California 94040	me followed by given include postal code ar the applicant's State (This person applie applie	is: ant only ant and inventor
USA						ed, do not fill in below.)
State (that is, country) of national	ality:		State (that is, co US			
This person is applicant for the purposes of:	all designated States	all designated the United Stat	States except es of America	the of	United States America only	the States indicated in the Supplemental Box
Name and address: [Family na disignation. The address must address must a decess indicated in this Box is of residence is indicated below. CHEN, Liqun 1 Harvest Close Bradley Stoke Bristol BS32 9DQ GB	me followed by giver include postal code a the applicant's State (n name; for a le nd name of coun (that is, country)	gal entity, full o, by. The country of residence if no	fficial of the State	applic invent	is: ant only ant and inventor or only (If this check-box and, do not fill in below.)
State (that is, country) of nation	ality:		State (that is, co	ountry) of	residence:	
This person is applicant for the purposes of:	all designated States	all designated the United Stat	States except es of America	the of	United States America only	the States indicated in the Supplemental Box
Name and address: (Family no designation: The address must address indicated in this Box is of residence is indicated below. PEARSON, Siani Lynne 35 Sandyleaze Westbury on Trym Bristol BS9 3PZ GB	une followed by give include postal code a the applicant's State)	n name; for a le nd name of coun (that is, country)	gal entity, full of by. The country of residence if no	fficial of the State	x appli	n is: cant only cant and inventor ntor only (If this check-box rked, do not fill in below.)
State (that is, country) of nation	nality:		State (that is, c	country) of	residence:	
This person is applicant for the purposes of:	all designated States	all designated the United Sta	States except ites of America	X th	e United States America only	the States indicated in the Supplemental Box
Name and address: (Family in designation. The address must address must address indicated in this Box is of residence is indicated below BALACHEFF, Bonis 215 High Kingsdown St Michael's Hill Bristol BS2 8DG GB	ame followed by give include postal code (the applicant's State)	m name; for a l and name of cou (that is, country)	egal entity, full d iby. The country of residence if n		This person appli appli inve	on is: cant only cant and inventor ntor only (If this check-box whed, do not fill in below.)
State (that is, country) of nation	nality:		State (that is, c	ountry) of	residence:	

all designated States except the United States of America

all designated
States

Further applicants and/or (further) inventors are indicated on another continuation sheet.

This person is applicant for the purposes of:

•)

the States indicated in the Supplemental Box

the United States of America only

		- 3
Chast	M-	J

Continuation of Box No. II	I FURTING A	PPLICANT(S) A	ND/OR (FURTH	ER) INV	en s)	
	the following sub				luded in the r	equest.
Name and address: (Family) designation. The address mu address indicated in this Box of residence is indicated belo	name followed by g st include postal coa is the applicant's Su w.)	iven name; for a le le and name of coun ate (that is, country)	gal entity, full off by The country of of residence if no	ficial of the State	This person i	
VAN WILDER, Bruno E 27-Alma Roád I Clifton Bristol BS8 2BZ GB	dgard 13 BOUWE QQIST BERGIUM (BE)				application inventor is market	nt and inventor or only (If this check-box d, do not fill in below.)
State (that is, country) of nation	onality:		State (that is, con GB			
This person is applicant for the purposes of:	all designated States		tes of America	of A	United States unerica only	the States indicated in the Supplemental Bo
Name and address: (Family designation. The address madbress indicated in this Box of residence is indicated below the comment of the comment	name followed by g st mclude postal cox is the applicant's Si rw.)	riven name; for a li de and name of cour ale (that is, country)	gal enthy, Juli of try. The country of residence if no	ficial of the State	invento	
State (that is, country) of nati	onality:		State (that is, co	untry) of	residence:	
This person is applicant for the purposes of:	all designated States	all designated the United Sta	States except tes of America	the of	United States Imerica only	the States indicated the Supplemental Be
Name and address: (Family designation. The address mid address indicated in this Box of residence is indicated beli of residence is indicated beli	name followed by E ust include postal co is the applicant's Si ow.)	given name; for a l de and name of cour late (that is, country)	egal entity, full of try. The country of residence if no	gicial of the State	applica	is: ant only ant and inventor tor only (If this check-box ked, do not fill in below.)
State (that is, country) of nat	ionality:		State (that is, co	ountry) of	residence:	
This person is applicant for the purposes of:	all designated States	all designated the United St	States except ates of America	the of	United States America only	the States indicate the Supplemental
Name and address: (Family designation. The address m address indicated in this Bos of residence is indicated be	name followed by ust include postal cc x is the applicant's S low)	given name; for a de and name of cou State (that is, countr)	legal entity, full o nbry. The country) of residence if no	of the State	applic	n is: eant only eant and inventor ator only (If this check-box ked, do not fill in below.)
State (that is, country) of na	tionality:		State (that is, co	ountry) of	residence:	
This person is applicant for the purposes of:	all designated States	all designate the United S	d States except tates of America	U th	e United States America only	the States indicate the Supplemental
Further applicants a	nd/or (further) inve	ntors are indicated	on another contin	nuation sh	ect.	
l						

The following designations are hereby made under Rule 4.9(a) (mark the applicable check-boxes, at least one must be marked): Regional Patent A ARIPO Patent: GH Ghana, GM Gambia, KE Kenya, LS Lesotho, MW Malawi, SD Sudan, SL Sierra Leone, SZ Swaz, TZ United Republic of Tanzania, UG Uganda, ZW Zimbabwe, and any other State which is a Contracting State of the HProtocol and of the PCT BEA Eurasian Patent: AM Armenia, AZ Azerbaijan, BY Belarus, KG Kyrgyzstan, KZ Kazakhstan, MD Republic of Mol RU Russian Federation, TJ Tajikistan, TM Turkmenistan, and any other State which is a Contracting State of the Eurasian Fueron and of the PCT EP European Patent: AT Austria, BE Belgium, CH and LI Switzerland and Liechtenstein, CY Cyprus, DE Germ DK Denmark, ES Spain, FI Finland, FR France, GB United Kingdom, GR Greece, IE Ireland, IT Italy, LU Luxemb MC Monaco, NL Netherlands, FT Portugal, SE Sweden, and any other State which is a Contracting State of the European Fachon and of the PCT OA OAPI Patent: BF Burkina Faso, BJ Benin, CF Central African Republic, CG Congo, CI Côte d'Ivoire, CM Came GA Gabon, GN Guinea, GW Guinea-Bissau, ML Mali, MR Mauntania, NE Niger, SN Senegal, TD Chad, TG Togo, an other State which is a member State of OAPI and a Contracting State of the PCT (if other kind of protection or treatment despection on the Monaco, National Patent (if other kind of protection or treatment desired, specify on dotted line) National Patent (if other kind of protection or treatment desired, specify on dotted line) AL Albania							
AP ARIPO Patent: GH Ghana, GM Gambia, KE Kenya, LS Lesotho, MW Malawi, SD Sudan, SL Sierra Leone, SZ Swaz- TZ United Republic of Tanzania, UG Uganda, ZW Zimbabwe, and any other State which is a Contracting State of the H- Protocol and of the PCT EA Eurasian Patent: AM Armenia, AZ Azerbaijan, BY Belarus, KG Kyrgyzstan, KZ Kazakhstan, MD Republic of Mol RU Russian Federation, TJ Tajikistan, TM Turkmenistan, and any other State which is a Contracting State of the Eurasian F Convention and of the PCT EP European Patent: AT Austria, BE Belgium, CH and LI Switzerland and Liechtenstein, CY Cyprus, DE Gerr DK Dennark, ES Spain, FI Finland, FR France, GB United Kingdom, GR Greece, IR Ireland, TI Hay, LU Luxernb MC Monaco, NL Netherlands, FT Portugal, SE Sweden, and any other State which is a Contracting State of the Eurapean F Convention and of the PCT OA OAPI Patent: BF Burkina Faso, BJ Benin, CF Central African Republic, CG Congo, CI Côte d'Ivoire, CM Came GA Gabon, GN Guinea, GW Guinea-Bissau, ML Mali, MR Maunitania, NE Niger, SN Senegal, TD Chad, TG Togo, an other State which is a member State of OAPI and a Contracting State of the PCT (if other kind of protection or treatment des specify on dotted line) National Patent if other kind of protection or treatment desired, specify on dotted line) AE United Arab Emirates							
Tz United Republic of Taizania, AZ Azerbaijan, BY Belarus, KG Kyrgyzstan, KZ Kazakhstan, MD Republic of Mol RU Russian Federation, TJ Tajakistan, TM Turkmenistan, and any other State which is a Contracting State of the Eurasian F Convention and of the PCT EP European Patent: AT Austria, BE Belgium, CH and LI Switzerland and Liechtenstein, CY Cyprus, DE Gerr DK Denmark ES Spain, FI Finland, FR France, GB United Kingdom, GR Greece, IE Iteland, TI Italy, LU Luxemb MC Monaco, NL Netherlands, FT Portugal, SE Sweden, and any other State which is a Contracting State of the European F Convention and of the PCT OA OAPI Patent: BF Burkina Faso, BJ Benin, CF Central African Republic, CG Congo, CI Côte d'Ivoire, CM Came GA Gabon, GN Guinea, GW Guinea-Bissau, ML Mali, MR Maunitania, NE Niger, SN Senegal, TD Chad, TG Togo, an other State which is a member State of OAPI and a Contracting State of the PCT (if other kind of protection or treatment despection on dotted line) National Patent (if other kind of protection or treatment desired, specify on dotted line) AE United Arab Emirates	iland						
RA Eurasian Patent: AM Armenia, AZ Azerbaijan, BY Belarus, KG Kyrgyzstan, KZ Kazaknsan, MD Republic of John RU Russian Federation, TJ Tajikistan, TM Turkmenistan, and any other State which is a Contracting State of the Eurasian F Convention and of the PCT							
E P European Patent: AT Austria, BE Belgium, CH and LI Switzerland and Liechtenstein, CF Cyptis, Dis Vering Denmark, ES Spain, FI Finland, FR France, GB United Kingdom, GR Gree, EB Ireland, TI Italy, LU Luxemb MC Monaco, NL Netherlands, PT Portugal, SE Sweden, and any other State which is a Contracting State of the European F Convention and of the PCT OA OAPI Patent: BF Burkina Faso, BJ Benin, CF Central African Republic, CG Congo, Cl Côte d'Voire, CM Came GA Gabon, GN Guinea, GW Guinea-Bissau, ML Mali, MR Mauntana, NE Niger, SN Senegal, TD Chad, TG Togo, an other State which is a member State of OAPI and a Contracting State of the PCT (if other kind of protection or treatment despecify on dotted line) National Patent (if other kind of protection or treatment desired, specify on dotted line): AE United Arab Emirates							
OA OAPI Patent: BF Burkina Faso, BJ Benin, CF Central African Republic, CG Congo, CI Cote a Ivolic, CM Calme GA Gabon, GN Guinea, GW Guinea-Bissau, ML Mail, MR Maunitania, NE Niger, SN Senegal, TD Chad, TG Togo, an other State which is a member State of OAPI and a Contracting State of the PCT (if other kind of protection or treatment despecify on dotted line) National Patent (if other kind of protection or treatment desired, specify on dotted line): AE United Arab Emirates	nany, ourg, atent						
National Patent (if other kind of protection or treatment desired, specify on dotted line): AR United Arab Emirates	OA OAPI Patent: BF Burkina Faso, BJ Benin, CF Central African Republic, CG Congo, CT Cote a Novie, CM Cameloni, GA Gabon, GN Guinea, GW Guinea-Bissau, ML Mali, MR Mauntania, NE Niger, SN Senegal, TD Chad, TG Togo, and any other State which is a member State of OAPI and a Contracting State of the PCT (if other kind of protection or treatment desired,						
□ AE United Arab Emirates □ LR Liberia □ AL Albania □ LS Lesotho □ AM Armenia □ LT Lithuania □ AT Austria □ LU Luxembourg □ AU Australia □ LV Latvia □ AZ Azerbaijan □ MA Morocco □ BA Bosnia and Herzegovina □ MD Republic of Moldova □ BB Barbados □ MG Madagascar □ BC Bulgaria □ MK The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia □ BR Brazil □ MK The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia							
AM Armenia							
□ AT Austria □ LU Luxembourg □ AU Australia □ LV Latvia □ AZ Azerbaijan □ MA Morocco □ BB Barbados □ MC Republic of Moldova □ BB Barbados □ MC Madagascar □ BC Bulgaria □ MK The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia □ BR Brazil							
AU Australia							
□ AZ Azerbaijan □ MA Morocco □ BA Bosnia and Herzegovina □ MD Republic of Moldova □ BB Barbados □ MG Madagascar □ BG Bulgaria □ MK The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia □ BR Brazil □ MK The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia							
□ BA Bosnia and Herzegovina □ MD Republic of Moldova □ BB Barbados □ MG Madagascar □ BG Bulgaria □ MK The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia □ BR Brazil							
□ BB Barbados □ MG Madagascar □ BG Bulgaria □ MK The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia □ BR Brazil □ MK The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia							
☐ BG Bulgaria ☐ MK The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia ☐ BR Brazii ☐ BR							
□ BR Brazil							
1 -							
LI DI Dolates							
CA Canada							
CH and LI Switzerland and Liechtenstein MX Mexico							
CN China							
CR Costa Rica							
CU Cuba PL Poland							
CZ Czech Republic PT Portugal							
DE Germany RO Romania							
DK Denmark RU Russian Federation							
DM Dominica SD Sudan							
☐ EE Estonia ☐ SE Sweden							
ES Spain DSG Singapore							
PI Finland SI Slovenia							
GB United Kingdom							
☐ GD Grenada ☐ SL Sierra Leone							
D ==							
☐ GM Gambia ☐ TR Turkey ☐ TT Trinidad and Tobago ☐ TT Trinidad And Tob							
☐ HU Hungary ☐ TZ United Republic of Tanzania							
□ ID Indonesia □ UA Ukraine							
☐ IL Israel ☐ UG Uganida							
□ IN India							
☐ IS Iceland	• • • •						
☑ UZ Uzbekistan							
□ KR Kenya □ VN Viet Nam							
□ KG Kyrgyzstan □ YU Yugoslavia							
KP Democratic People's Republic of Korea ZA South Africa							
☐ KR Republic of Korea Check-boxer reserved for designating States which become party to the PCT after issuance of this sheet:	have						
KZ Kazakhstan							
□ LC Saint Lucia							
Precautionary Designation Statement: In addition to the designations made above, the applicant also makes under Rule 4.9(b) a designations which would be permitted under the PCT except any designation(s) indicated in the Supplemental Box as being or from the scope of this statement. The applicant declares that those additional designation are subject to confirmation and to designation which is not confirmed before the expiration of 15 months from the priority date is to be regarded as withdrawn by the at at the expiration of that time limit. (Confirmation (including fees) must reach the receiving Office within the 15-month time limit.)	hat an						

Sheet No. 5

Box No. VI PRIORITY C	LAIM	U	☐ Fu	rther prior	rity claims are	in the	Supplemental Box.
Filing date	1	Number			Where earlier applicat		
of earlier application (day/month/year)	of earl	er application	national appli country		regional application:* regional Office		ational application: ecciving Office
item (1) (15.02.99) 15 February 1999 99301100.6 EP							
item (2) (05.03.99) 5 March 1999 9905056.9 GB							
	-		_			 	
item (3)							
The receiving Office is re of the earlier applications purposes of the present in	s) (only if	ine eariier appi	the receiving Offic	e) identif	ied above as item(s):		
Where the earlier opplication is Convention for the Protection of I	on ARIPO ndustrial Pi	opplicatian, it is n operty for which t	nandatory ta indico that earlier applicat	te in the Si ian was file	applemental Box at least a ad (Rule 4.10(b)(ii)). See S	ne coun upplem	try party to the Paris ental Box.
Box No. VII INTERNATI	ONAL SE	ARCHING AU	THORITY				
Choice of International Sear- (if two or more International S competent to corry out the inter	ching Auth	nority (ISA) R. settle thorities ore settle thorities ore	equest to use rest earch has been carrie	ults of ear	rlier search; reference requested from the Interne	unonor L	car ching manior ray,
the Authority chosen; the two-lette	r code may	ne usea):	ate (doy/manth/year))	Number	EP	try (or regional Office)
ISA/ EP		1	l6 July 1999		99301100	EP	
Box No. VIII CHECK LIS	T; LANC	UAGE OF FIL	LING				
This international application the following number of she	contains ets:	This internation		accompa	nied by the item(s) mar	ked bel	ow:
request : 5		. –		attorney			
description (excluding		2. La separat	e signed power of	attorner	reference number, if a	nv:	
sequence listing part) : 14						,.	
claims : 4		4. stateme	ent explaining lack	COI SIGNAL	Dow No. VI se item(s).	1.2	
abstract : 1		5. priority	document(s) ider	innea in i	Box No. VI as item(s):	- ر	
drawings : 5		6. translat	tion of internation	ai applica	tion into (language):	or othe	r biological material
sequence listing part of description		7. separat	te indications conc tide and/or amino	acid sequ	eposited mieroorganism ence listing in eompute	r reada	ble form
Total number of sheets : 25		9. To other (specify): Copy of	Search R	eport		
Figure of the drawings whi should accompany the abstra	eh _		Language of filin	g of the	English		
D. N. IV CICNATUD	POPADE	LICANT OR A	GENT				
Box No. IX SIGNATURE OF APPLICANT OR AGENT Next to each signature, indicate the name of the person signing and the capacity in which the person sign (if such capacity is not obvious from reading the request). Richard Anthony Lawrence							
	4		or receiving Office	use only			2. Drawings:
Date of actual receipt of international application							received:
 Corrected date of actual timely received papers of the purported internation 	drawings al applicat	completing ion:					
 Date of timely receipt of corrections under PCT A 					 		not received:
5. International Searching (if two or more are comp	Authority etent):	SA/	6.	Transm until sc	uittal of search eopy dela arch fee is paid.	aycd	
		For I	International Bure	au use on	ly		
Date of receipt of the recor	d copy						

NT COOPERATION TREATY

PCT

INTERNATIONAL SEARCH REPORT

(PCT Article 18 and Rules 43 and 44)

Applicant's or agent's file reference	FOR FURTHER see Notification of	f Transmittal of International Search Report 20) as well as, where applicable, item 5 below.
30990050 WO	ACTION	
International application No.	International filing date (day/month/year)	(Earliest) Priority Date (day/month/year)
PCT/GB 00/00528	15/02/2000	15/02/1999
Applicant		
HEWLETT-PACKARD COMPANY e	t al.	
This International Search Report has bee according to Article 18. A copy is being tr	n prepared by this International Searching Auth	ority and is transmitted to the applicant
This International Search Report consists X It is also accompanied by	of a total of sheets. a copy of each prior art document cited in this	report.
Basis of the report		
 a. With regard to the language, the language in which it was filed, un 	international search was carried out on the bas less otherwise indicated under this item.	is of the international application in the
the international search w Authority (Rule 23.1(b)).	as carried out on the basis of a translation of the	ne international application furnished to this
With regard to any nucleotide ar was carried out on the basis of th	id/or amino acid sequence disclosed in the in	ternational application, the international search
	onal application in written form.	
filed together with the inte	rnational application in computer readable forn	n.
furnished subsequently to	this Authority in written form.	
furnished subsequently to	this Authority in computer readble form.	
the statement that the sui international application a	osequently furnished written sequence listing do is filed has been furnished.	oes not go beyond the disclosure in the
the statement that the inf furnished	ormation recorded in computer readable form is	s identical to the written sequence listing has been
Certain claims were four	nd unsearchable (See Box I).	
3. Unity of invention is lac	king (see Box II).	
With regard to the title,		•
X the text is approved as si	ubmitted by the applicant.	
the text has been established	shed by this Authority to read as follows:	
the text has been establic within one month from the	ubmitted by the applicant. shed, according to Rule 38.2(b), by this Authori e date of mailing of this international search rep	ty as it appears in Box III. The applicant may, oort, submit comments to this Authority.
	lished with the abstract is Figure No.	None of the figures.
as suggested by the app		
because the applicant fai	r characterizes the invention.	
Decause this rigure bette	- STATES OF THE	

Form PCT/ISA/210 (first sheet) (July 1998)

INTERNATIONAL SEARCH REPORT

onal Application No 3 00/00528

	Per, GE
A. CLASSIFICATION OF SUBJECT MATTER	

IPC 7 G06F1/00 G06F12/14

According to International Patent Classification (IPC) or to both national classification and IPC

B. FIELDS SEARCHED

Minimum documentation searched (classification system followed by classification symbols) G06F IPC 7

Documentation searched other than minimum documentation to the extent that such documents are included in the fields searched

Electronic data base consulted during the international search (name of data base and, where practical, search terms used)

Category °	Citation of document, with indication, where appropriate, of the	ne relevant passages	Relevant to claim No.
A K	WO 98 15082 A (INTEL CORP) 9 April 1998 (1998-04-09) the whole document		1-4,7, 11,21 5,8-10, 12-15
4	EP 0 849 657 A (NCR INT INC) 24 June 1998 (1998-06-24) the whole document		1,2,7
		-/	
X Funt	ner documents are listed in the continuation of box C.	. Patent family members are listed	d in annex.
A" docume conside a docume filling ducume which citation of docume other r	ont which may throw doubts on priority claim(s) or is cited to establish the publication date of another n or other special reason (as specified) ent referring to an oral disclosure, use, exhibition or	"T" later document published after the int or priority date and not in conflict will cited to understand the principle or it invention or conflict will cited to understand the principle or the cannot be considered novel or cannot involve an inventive step when the different confliction or c	In the application but neory underlying the claimed invention of be considered to ocument is taken alone claimed invention neutrive step when the lore other such docu- pous to a person skilled
ate of the	actual completion of the international search 0 March 2000	Date of mailing of the international set	earch report
3			

INTERNATIONAL SEARCH REPORT



		1 C 1 / GB CO / CC 3 Z C
C.(Continue	tion) DOCUMENTS CONSIDERED TO BE RELEVANT Citation of document, with indication, where appropriate, of the relevant passages	Relevant to claim No.
Α.	WO 95 24696 A (INTEGRATED TECH AMERICA; MOONEY DAVID M (US); WOOD DAVID E (US); K) 14 September 1995 (1995-09-14) abstract; figure 3 page 3, paragraph 3 page 9, paragraph 2 - paragraph 3 page 12, paragraph 3 -page 13, paragraph 1 page 19, last paragraph -page 20, paragraph 1 page 21, paragraph 1 -page 22, paragraph 2 page 27, paragraph 2 -page 28, paragraph 1 claims 4,16	1,2,4,6-8,10
۹ ا	US 5 680 547 A (CHANG STEVE MING-JANG) 21 October 1997 (1997-10-21) the whole document	16,19
Α	EP 0 510 244 A (ACER INC) 28 October 1992 (1992-10-28)	

INTERMITIONAL SEARCH REPORT

Informan on patent family members

In population No PCT/GB 00/00528

Patent document cited in search report		1	Publication date		Patent family member(s)	Publication date	
WO	9815082	Α	09-04-1998	US	5844986 A	01-12-1998	
				ΑU	4146197 A	24-04-1998	
				CN	1231787 A	13-10-1999	
				EP	0932953 A	04-08-1999	
EP	0849657	Α	24-06-1998	JP	10282884 A	23-10-1998	
WO	9524696	Α	14-09-1995	US	5610981 A	1 1 -03-1997	
				ΑT	175505 T	15-01-1999	
				AU	703856 B	01-04-1999	
				AU	2092695 A	25-09-1995	
				BR	9506968 A	01-06-1999	
				CA	2183759 A	14-09-1995	
				CN	1146813 A	02-04-1997	
				DE	69507129 D	18-02-1999	
				DE	69507129 T	05-08-1999	
				ΕP	0748474 A	18-12-1996	
				NZ	282954 A	24-11-1997	
US	5680547	Α	21-10-1997	US	5444850 A	22-08-1995	
				AU	1042895 A	15-05-1996	
				JP	10511783 T	10-11-1998	
				WO	9613002 A	02-05-1996	
EP	0510244	Α	28-10-1992	JP	6348486 A	22-12-1994	
				US	5511184 A	23-04-1996	

The demand must be filed directly with the content International Preliminary Examining Authority or, if the property of the applicant. The full name or two-letter code of that Authority may be indicated by the applicant on the line below:

IPEA/ EP

PCT

CHAPTER II

DEMAND

under Article 31 of the Patent Cooperation Treaty:
The undersigned requests that the international application specified below be the subject of international preliminary examination according to the Patent Cooperation Treaty and hereby elects all eligible States (except where otherwise indicated).

For	International Preliminary	Examining Authority	use only				
Identification of IPEA		Date of receipt of DEMAND					
Box No. I IDENTIFICATION OF T	HE INTERNATIONAL	APPLICATION	Applicant's or agent's file reference 30990050 WO				
International application No.	International filing da	te (day/month/year)	(Earliest) Priority date (day/month/year)				
PCT/GB 00/00528	15 February 2000 ((15/02/00)	15 February 1999 (15/02/99)				
Title of invention							
Trusted Computing Platform							
Box No. II APPLICANT(S)	Box No. II APPLICANT(S)						
Name and address: (Family name followed by g The address must include p	given name; for a legal critity, fo ostal code and name of country	ull official designation. r.)	Telephone No.:				
Hewlett-Packard Company 3000 Hanover Street			Facsimile No.:				
Palo Alto							
CA 94304 USA			Teleprinter No.:				
State (that is, country) of nationality:		State (that is, country) of residence:					
US		us					
Name and address: (Family name followed by §	given name; for o legal entity, f	full officiol designation. The	address must include postal code and name of country.)				
PROUDLER, Graeme John 5 Touchstone Avenue Stoke Gifford Bristol BS34 8XQ GB							
State (that is, country) of nationality: GB		State (that is, country)	of residence:				
Name and address: (Family name followed by given name; for a legal entity, full official designation. The address must include postal code and name of country.)							
GUPTA, Dipankar 983 Sladky Ave Mountain View California 94040 US							
State (that is, country) of nationality:		State (that is, country,) of residence:				
Further applicants are indicated on a continuation sheet.							

Form PCT/IPEA/401 (first sheet) (July 1998; reprint July 1999)

See Notes to the demand form

Sheet No. 2.

International application No.
PCT/GB 00/00528

this sheet should not be included in the demand. , full official designation. The address must include postal code and name of country.)
, full official designation. The address must include postal code and name of country.)
•
State (that is, country) of residence: GB
v, full officiol designation. The address must include postal code and name of country.)
State (that is, country) of residence: GB
y, full official designotion. The address must include postol code and nome of country.)
State (that is, country) of residence: GB
1 v), full official designation. The address must include postal code ond name of country,
State (that is, country) of residence:
GB

Sheet No. 3.

International application No.
PCT/GB 00/00528

If none of the following sub-boxes is	s used, this sheet should not be included in the demand.
Name and address: (Family name followed by given nome; for o leg CHAN, David 16112 Mays Avenue Monte Sereno California CA 95030 US	ral entity, full official designotion. The oddress must include postal code and name of cou
State (that is, country) of nationality:	State (that is, country) of residence: US
State (that is, country) of nationality:	State (that is, country) of residence:
Name and address: (Family name followed by given name; for o leg	gal entity, full official designation. The address must include postol code and name of co
Name and address: (Family name followed by given name: for o le	
Name and address: (Family name followed by given name; for o leg	gal entity, full official designation. The address must include postol code and name of c
State (that is, country) of nationality:	·

Sheet No. 4

International application No. PCT/GB 00/00528

Box N_0 . III AGENT OR COMMON REPRESENTATIVE; OR ADDRESS FOR COR	RRESPONDENCE		
The following person is agent common representative			
and K has been appointed earlier and represents the applicant(s) also for international prel	iminary examination.		
is hereby appointed and any earlier appointment of (an) agent(s)/common represent	tative is hereby revoked.		
is hereby appointed, specifically for the procedure before the International Prelimit the agent(s)/common representative appointed earlier.	nary Examining Authority, in addition t		
Name and address: (Family name followed by given name; for a legal entity, full official designation. The address must include postal code and name of country.)	Telephone No.:		
LAWRENCE. Richard Anthony	+44-117-312-8295		
Hewlett-Packard Limited	Facsimile No.:		
Intellectual Property Section	+44-117-312-8941		
Filton Road Stoke Gifford			
Bristol BS34 8QZ	Teleprinter No.:		
GB			
Address for correspondence: Mark this check-box where no agent or common rep space above is used instead to indicate a special address to which correspondence	resentative is/has been appointed and should be sent.		
Box No. IV BASIS FOR INTERNATIONAL PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION			
Statement concerning amendments:*			
1. The applicant wishes the international preliminary examination to start on the basis of:			
the international application as originally filed			
the description as originally filed			
as amended under Article 34			
the claims as originally filed			
as amended under Article 19 (together with any accompanying	ing statement)		
as amended under Article 34			
the drawings as originally filed			
as amended under Article 34			
2. The applicant wishes any amendment to the claims under Article 19 to be consider	red as reversed.		
from the priority date unless the International Preliminary Examining Authority	receives a copy of any amendments ma		
under Article 19 or a notice from the applicant that he does not wish to make such box may be marked only where the time limit under Article 19 has not yet expired	amendments (Rule 69.1(d)). (This che		
* Where no shock how is marked international preliminary examination will start on	the basis of the international applicati		
as originally filed or, where a copy of amendments to the claims under Article 19 and/or a under Article 34 are received by the International Preliminary Examining Authority befor or the international preliminary examination report, as so amended.	menaments of the international applicat		
Language for the purposes of international preliminary examination: English			
which is the language in which the international application was filed.			
which is the language of a translation furnished for the purposes of internation	nal search.		
which is the language of publication of the international application.			
which is the language of the translation (to be) furnished for the purposes of interr	ational preliminary examination.		
Box No. V ELECTION OF STATES			
The applicant hereby elects all eligible States (that is, all States which have been designated	ted and which are bound by Chapter I		
the PCT)			
excluding the following States which the applicant wishes not to elect:			

)

Sheet No. 5. International application No. PCT/GB 00/0052						
Box No. VI CHECK LIST						
The demand is accompanied by the following ele Box No. IV, for the purposes of international pr	For International Preliminary Examining Authority use only received not received					
1. translation of international application	:	sheets				
2. amendments under Article 34	:	sheets				
copy (or, where required, translation) of amendments under Article 19	:	sheets				
copy (or, where required, translation) of statement under Article 19	:	shects				
5. letter	:	sheets				
6. other (specify)	:	sheets				
The demand is also accompanied by the item(s) marked below: 1. fee calculation sheet 4. statement explaining lack of signature 2. separate signed power of attorney 5. nucleotide and or amino acid sequence listing in computer readable form 3. other (specify): Box No. VII SIGNATURE OF APPLICANT, AGENT OR COMMON REPRESENTATIVE Next to each signature, indicate the name of the person signing and the capacity in which the person signs (if such capacity is not obvious from reading the demand). Richard Anthony Lawrence						
For Internati Date of actual receipt of DEMAND:	onal Preliminary	Examining Authority u	se only			
2. Adjusted date of receipt of demand due to CORRECTIONS under Rule 60.1(b):						
3. The date of receipt of the demand is AFTER the expiration of 19 months from the priority date and item 4 or 5, below, does not apply.						
4. The date of receipt of the demand is WITHIN the period of 19 months from the priority date as extended by virtue of Rule 80.5.						
5. Although the date of receipt of the demand is after the expiration of 19 months from the priority date, the delay in arrival is EXCUSED pursuant to Rule 82.						
	For Internations	al Bureau use only				
Demand received from IPEA on:						

D INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION International Bureau



INTERNATIONAL APPLICATION PUBLISHED UNDER THE PATENT COOPERATION TREATY (PCT)

(51) International Patent Classificati n 7: G06F 1/00, 12/14

A1

(11) International Publication Number:

WO 00/48063

(21) International Application Number:

(43) International Publication Date:

17 August 2000 (17.08.00)

PCT/GB00/00528

(22) International Filing Date:

15 February 2000 (15.02.00)

(74) Agent: LAWRENCE, Richard, Anthony; Hewlett-Packard Limited, Intellectual Property Section, Filton Road, Stoke

Gifford, Bristol BS34 8QZ (GB).

(30) Priority Data:

99301100.6 9905056.9

15 February 1999 (15.02.99)

EP 5 March 1999 (05.03.99) GB (81) Designated States: JP, US, European patent (AT, BE, CH, CY, DE, DK, ES, FI, FR, GB, GR, IE, IT, LU, MC, NL, PT,

(71) Applicant (for all designated States except US): HEWLETT-PACKARD COMPANY [US/US]: 3000

Published

With international search report.

(72) Inventors; and


(75) Inventors/Applicants (for US only): PROUDLER, Graeme. John [GB/GB]; 5 Touchstone Avenue, Stoke Gifford, Bristol BS34 8XQ (GB). GUPTA, Dipankar [IN/US]; 983 Sladky Ave., Mountain View, CA 94040 (US). CHEN, Liqun [CN/GB]; 1 Harvest Close, Bradley Stoke, Bristol BS32 9DQ (GB). PEARSON, Siani, Lynne [GB/GB]; 35 Sandyleaze, Westbury on Trym, Bristol BS9 3PZ (GB). BALACHEFF, Boris [FR/GB]; 215 High Kingsdown, St Michael's Hill, Bristol BS2 8DG (GB), VAN WILDER. Bruno, Edgard [BE/BE]; 1/3 Bauwensplaats, B-9300 Aalst (BE). CHAN, David [GB/US]; 16112 Mays Avenue, Monte Sereno, CA 95030 (US).

Hanover Street, Palo Alto, CA 94304 (US).

(54) Title: TRUSTED COMPUTING PLATFORM

(57) Abstract

In a computing platform, a trusted hardware device (24) is added to the motherboard (20). The trusted hardware device (24) is configured to acquire an integrity metric, for example a hash of the BIOS memory (29), of the computing platform. The trusted hardware device (24) is tamper-resistant, difficult to forge and inaccessible to other functions of the platform (hardware or sofware) has not been subverted in some way, and is safe to interact with in local or remote applications. In more details, the main processing unit (21) of the computing platform is directed to address the trusted hardware device (24), in advance of the BIOS memory, after release from "reset". The trusted hardware device (24) is configured to receive memory read signals from the main processing unit (21) and, in response, return instructions, in the native language of main processing unit (21), that instruct the main processing unit to establish the hash and return the value to be stored by the trusted hardware device (24. Since the hash is calculated in advance of any other system operations, this is a relatively strong method



of verifying the integrity of the system. Once the hash has been returned, the final instruction calls the BIOS program and the system boot procedure continues as normal. Whenever a user wishes to interact with the computing platform, he first requests the integrity metric, which he compares with an authentic integrity metric that was measured by a trusted party. If the metrics are the same, the platform is verified and interactions can continue. Otherwise, interaction halts on the basis that the operation of the platform may have been subverted.

FOR THE PURPOSES OF INFORMATION ONLY

Codes used to identify States party to the PCT on the front pages of pamphlets publishing international applications under the PCT. 1.8

AL	Albania	ES	Spain	LS	Lesotho	SI	Slovenia
AM	Armenia	FI	Finland	LT	Lithuania	SK	Slovakia
AT	Austria	FR	France	LU	Luxembourg	SN	Senegal
ΑU	Australia	GA	Gabon	LV	Latvia	SZ	Swaziland
ΑZ	Azerbaijan	GB	United Kingdom	MC	Monaco	TD	Chad
BA	Bosnia and Herzegovina	GE	Georgia	MD	Republic of Moldova	TG	Togo
BB	Barbados	GH	Ghana	MG	Madagascar	TJ	Tajikistan
BE	Belgium	GN	Guinea	MK	The former Yugoslav	TM	Turkmenistan
BF	Burkina Faso	GR	Greece		Republic of Macedonia	TR	Turkey
BG	Bulgaria	HU	Hungary	ML	Mali	TT	Trinidad and Tobago
BJ	Benin	IE	Ireland	MN	Mongolia	UA	Ukraine
BR	Brazil	IL	Israel	MR	Mauritania	UG	Uganda
BY	Belarus	IS	Iceland	MW	Malawi	US	United States of America
CA	Canada	IT	Italy	MX	Mexico	UZ	Uzbekistan
CF	Central African Republic	JP	Japan	NE	Niger	VN	Viet Nam
CG	Congo	KE	Kenya	NL	Netherlands	YU	Yugoslavia
CH	Switzerland	KG	Kyrgyzstan	NO	Norway	zw	Zimbabwe
CI	Côte d'Ivoire	KP	Democratic People's	NZ	New Zealand	2	Zimbabwe
CM	Cameroon		Republic of Korea	PL	Poland		
CNI	OL :				· Onung		

PT

RO RU

SD

SE

Portugal

Romania

Sudan

Sweden

Singapore

Russian Federation

Republic of Korea

Kazakstan

Saint Lucia

Sri Lanka

Liberia

Liechtenstein

KR

ΚZ

LC

ш

LK LR

CN CU CZ

DE

DK

Czech Republic

China

Cuba

Germany

Denmark

Estonia

Trusted Computing Platform

Technical Field

The present invention generally relates to trusted devices, trusted computing 5 platforms, trusted transactions and methods of operating the same.

Background Art

For commercial applications, a client computing platform typically operates in an environment where its behaviour is vulnerable to modification by local or remote entities.

10 This potential insecurity of the platform is a limitation on its use by local parties who might otherwise be willing to use the platform, or remote parties who might otherwise communicate with the platform; for example, for the purposes of E-commerce. For the present purposes, both local parties and remote parties will be referred to as "users" unless otherwise stated.

Existing security applications, for example virus detection software, execute on computing platforms under the assumption that the platform will operate as intended and that the platform will not subvert processes and applications. This is a valid assumption provided that the intended software state has not become unstable or has not been damaged by other software such as viruses. Users, therefore, typically restrict the use of such platforms to non-critical applications, and weigh the convenience of using the platforms against the risk to sensitive or business critical data.

Increasing the level of trust in platforms therefore enables greater user confidence in existing security applications (such as the 'Secure Sockets Layer' or 'IPSec') or remote management applications. This enables greater reliance on those applications and hence reduced 'cost of ownership'. Greater trust also enables new electronic methods of business, since there is greater confidence in the correct operation of both local and remote computing platforms.

In this document, the word 'trust' is used in the sense that something can be 'trusted' if it always behaves in the expected manner for the intended purpose.

30 Disclosure of the Invention

The present inventors have appreciated that it is desirable to use a physical device in a computing platform to verify and possibly enforce trust in that platform. Typically, the device provides trusted measurement and reporting of attributes of the associated platform, which indicate the integrity of the platform. Also, most preferably, the device is tamper-resistant.

In accordance with a first aspect, the present invention provides computing apparatus comprising, mounted on an assembly, main processing means and main memory means, each being connected for communication with one or more other components on the assembly, together with a trusted device mounted on the assembly and being connected for communications with one or more other components on the assembly, the trusted device being arranged to acquire a true value of an integrity metric of the computing apparatus.

As used herein for reasons of simplicity of description, the term "device" also encompasses plural devices having equivalent function, or equivalent functionality integrated into one or more existing platform devices or assemblies. Additionally, the term 'true' as used herein implies that the value is that which correctly reflects the state of the computing apparatus. This may be ensured if the measurement method is substantially un-modifiable other than by the trusted device.

In accordance with a second aspect, the present invention provides a method of operating a system comprising trusted computing apparatus and a user, the trusted computing apparatus incorporating a trusted device being arranged to acquire the true value of an integrity metric of the computing apparatus, the method comprising the steps of:

the trusted device acquiring the true value of the integrity metric of the trusted computing apparatus;

the user generating a challenge for the trusted computing apparatus to prove its 20 integrity and submitting the challenge to the trusted computing apparatus;

the trusted computing apparatus receiving the challenge, and the trusted device generating a response including the integrity metric and returning the response to the user; and

the user receiving the response, extracting the integrity metric from the response and comparing the integrity metric with an authenticated metric for the trusted computing apparatus that had been generated by a trusted party.

In accordance with a third aspect, the present invention provides a method of establishing a communications channel in a system between trusted computing apparatus and remote computing apparatus, the method including the step of the remote computing apparatus verifying the integrity of the trusted computing apparatus using the above method, and maintaining the communications channel for further transactions in the event the integrity of the trusted computing apparatus is successfully verified by the remote computing apparatus.

In accordance with a fourth embodiment, the present invention provides a method of verifying that trusted computing apparatus is trustworthy for use by a user for processing a

particular application, the method including the step of the user verifying the integrity of the trusted computing apparatus using the above method, and the user using the trusted computing apparatus to process the particular application in the event the integrity of the trusted computing apparatus is successfully verified by the remote computing apparatus.

Other aspects and embodiments of the present invention will become apparent from the following description and claims.

Brief Description of the Drawings

A preferred embodiment of the present invention will now be described by way of example only with reference to the accompanying drawings in which:

Figure 1 is a diagram that illustrates a system capable of implementing embodiments of the present invention;

Figure 2 is a diagram which illustrates a motherboard including a trusted device arranged to communicate with a smart card via a smart card reader and with a group of 15 modules;

Figure 3 is a diagram that illustrates the trusted device in more detail;

Figure 4 is a flow diagram which illustrates the steps involved in acquiring an integrity metric of the computing apparatus;

Figure 5 is a flow diagram which illustrates the steps involved in establishing communications between a trusted computing platform and a remote platform including the trusted platform verifying its integrity; and

Figure 6 is a flow diagram which illustrates the steps involved in verification of a trusted computing platform by a potential user of that platform by means of a smart card.

25 Best Mode For Carrying Out the Invention, & Industrial Applicability

The present exemplary embodiment generally provides the incorporation into a computing platform of a physical trusted device whose function is to bind the identity of the platform to reliably measured data that provides an integrity metric of the platform. The identity and the integrity metric are compared with expected values provided by a trusted party (TP) that is prepared to vouch for the trustworthiness of the platform. If there is a match, the implication is that at least part of the platform is operating correctly, depending on the scope of the integrity metric.

A user verifies the correct operation of the platform before exchanging other data with the platform. A user does this by requesting the trusted device to provide its identity and an integrity metric. (Optionally the trusted device will refuse to provide evidence of

identity if it itself was unable to verify correct operation of the platform.) The user receives the proof of identity and the identity metric, and compares them against values which it believes to be true. Those proper values are provided by the TP or another entity that is trusted by the user. If data reported by the trusted device is the same as that provided by the TP, the user trusts the platform. This is because the user trusts the entity. The entity trusts the platform because it has previously validated the identity and determined the proper integrity metric of the platform.

Once a user has established trusted operation of the platform, he exchanges other data with the platform. For a local user, the exchange might be by interacting with some software application running on the platform. For a remote user, the exchange might involve a secure transaction. In either case, the data exchanged is 'signed' by the trusted device. The user can then have greater confidence that data is being exchanged with a platform whose behaviour can be trusted.

The trusted device uses cryptographic processes but does not necessarily provide an external interface to those cryptographic processes. Also, a most desirable implementation would be to make the trusted device tamperproof, to protect secrets by making them inaccessible to other platform functions and provide an environment that is substantially immune to unauthorised modification. Since tamper-proofing is impossible, the best approximation is a trusted device that is tamper-resistant, or tamper-detecting. The trusted device, therefore, preferably consists of one physical component that is tamper-resistant.

Techniques relevant to tamper-resistance are well known to those skilled in the art of security. These techniques include methods for resisting tampering (such as appropriate encapsulation of the trusted device), methods for detecting tampering (such as detection of out of specification voltages, X-rays, or loss of physical integrity in the trusted device casing), and methods for eliminating data when tampering is detected. Further discussion of appropriate techniques can be found at http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~mgk25/tamper.html. It will be appreciated that, although tamper-proofing is a most desirable feature of the present invention, it does not enter into the normal operation of the invention and, as such, is beyond the scope of the present invention and will not be described in any detail herein.

The trusted device is preferably a physical one because it must be difficult to forge. It is most preferably tamper-resistant because it must be hard to counterfeit. It typically has an engine capable of using cryptographic processes because it is required to prove identity, both locally and at a distance, and it contains at least one method of measuring some integrity metric of the platform with which it is associated.

A trusted platform 10 is illustrated in the diagram in Figure 1. The platform 10 includes the standard features of a keyboard 14, mouse 16 and visual display unit (VDU) 18, which provide the physical 'user interface' of the platform. This embodiment of a trusted platform also contains a smart card reader 12 - a smart card reader is not an essential 5 element of all trusted platforms, but is employed in various preferred embodiments described below. Along side the smart card reader 12, there is illustrated a smart card 19 to allow trusted user interaction with the trusted platform as shall be described further below. In the platform 10, there are a plurality of modules 15: these are other functional elements of the trusted platform of essentially any kind appropriate to that platform (the functional 10 significance of such elements is not relevant to the present invention and will not be discussed further herein).

As illustrated in Figure 2, the motherboard 20 of the trusted computing platform 10 includes (among other standard components) a main processor 21, main memory 22, a trusted device 24, a data bus 26 and respective control lines 27 and lines 28, BIOS memory 29 containing the BIOS program for the platform 10 and an Input/Output (IO) device 23, which controls interaction between the components of the motherboard and the smart card reader 12, the keyboard 14, the mouse 16 and the VDU 18. The main memory 22 is typically random access memory (RAM). In operation, the platform 10 loads the operating system, for example Windows NT™, into RAM from hard disk (not shown). Additionally, in operation, the platform 10 loads the processes or applications that may be executed by the platform 10 into RAM from hard disk (not shown).

Typically, in a personal computer the BIOS program is located in a special reserved memory area, the upper 64K of the first megabyte do the system memory (addresses FØØØh to FFFFh), and the main processor is arranged to look at this memory location first, 25 in accordance with an industry wide standard.

The significant difference between the platform and a conventional platform is that, after reset, the main processor is initially controlled by the trusted device, which then hands control over to the platform-specific BIOS program, which in turn initialises all input/output devices as normal. After the BIOS program has executed, control is handed over as normal by the BIOS program to an operating system program, such as Windows NT (TM), which is typically loaded into main memory 22 from a hard disk drive (not shown).

Clearly, this change from the normal procedure requires a modification to the implementation of the industry standard, whereby the main processor 21 is directed to address the trusted device 24 to receive its first instructions. This change may be made 35 simply by hard-coding a different address into the main processor 21. Alternatively, the



trusted device 24 may be assigned the standard BIOS program address, in which case there is no need to modify the main processor configuration.

It is highly desirable for the BIOS boot block to be contained within the trusted device

24. This prevents subversion of the obtaining of the integrity metric (which could otherwise

5 occur if rogue software processes are present) and prevents rogue software processes

creating a situation in which the BIOS (even if correct) fails to build the proper environment

for the operating system.

Although, in the preferred embodiment to be described, the trusted device 24 is a single, discrete component, it is envisaged that the functions of the trusted device 24 may 10 alternatively be split into multiple devices on the motherboard, or even integrated into one or more of the existing standard devices of the platform. For example, it is feasible to integrate one or more of the functions of the trusted device into the main processor itself, provided that the functions and their communications cannot be subverted. This, however, would probably require separate leads on the processor for sole use by the trusted functions.

15 Additionally or alternatively, although in the present embodiment the trusted device is a hardware device that is adapted for integration into the motherboard 20, it is anticipated that a trusted device may be implemented as a 'removable' device, such as a dongle, which could be attached to a platform when required. Whether the trusted device is integrated or removable is a matter of design choice. However, where the trusted device is separable, a 20 mechanism for providing a logical binding between the trusted device and the platform should be present.

The trusted device 24 comprises a number of blocks, as illustrated in Figure 3. After system reset, the trusted device 24 performs a secure boot process to ensure that the operating system of the platform 10 (including the system clock and the display on the monitor) is running properly and in a secure manner. During the secure boot process, the trusted device 24 acquires an integrity metric of the computing platform 10. The trusted device 24 can also perform secure data transfer and, for example, authentication between it and a smart card via encryption/decryption and signature/verification. The trusted device 24 can also securely enforce various security control policies, such as locking of the user 30 interface.

Specifically, the trusted device comprises: a controller 30 programmed to control the overall operation of the trusted device 24, and interact with the other functions on the trusted device 24 and with the other devices on the motherboard 20; a measurement function 31 for acquiring the integrity metric from the platform 10; a cryptographic function 32 for signing, 35 encrypting or decrypting specified data; an authentication function 33 for authenticating a

WO 00/48063 PCT/GB00/00528 7

smart card; and interface circuitry 34 having appropriate ports (36, 37 & 38) for connecting the trusted device 24 respectively to the data bus 26, control lines 27 and address lines 28 of the motherboard 20. Each of the blocks in the trusted device 24 has access (typically via the controller 30) to appropriate volatile memory areas 4 and/or non-volatile memory areas 3 of 5 the trusted device 24. Additionally, the trusted device 24 is designed, in a known manner, to be tamper resistant.

For reasons of performance, the trusted device 24 may be implemented as an application specific integrated circuit (ASIC). However, for flexibility, the trusted device 24 is preferably an appropriately programmed micro-controller. Both ASICs and micro-controllers 10 are well known in the art of microelectronics and will not be considered herein in any further detail.

One item of data stored in the non-volatile memory 3 of the trusted device 24 is a certificate 350. The certificate 350 contains at least a public key 351 of the trusted device 24 and an authenticated value 352 of the platform integrity metric measured by a trusted party 15 (TP). The certificate 350 is signed by the TP using the TP's private key prior to it being stored in the trusted device 24. In later communications sessions, a user of the platform 10 can verify the integrity of the platform 10 by comparing the acquired integrity metric with the authentic integrity metric 352. If there is a match, the user can be confident that the platform 10 has not been subverted. Knowledge of the TP's generally-available public key enables 20 simple verification of the certificate 350. The non-volatile memory 35 also contains an identity (ID) label 353. The ID label 353 is a conventional ID label, for example a serial number, that is unique within some context. The ID label 353 is generally used for indexing and labelling of data relevant to the trusted device 24, but is insufficient in itself to prove the identity of the platform 10 under trusted conditions.

The trusted device 24 is equipped with at least one method of reliably measuring or acquiring the integrity metric of the computing platform 10 with which it is associated. In the present embodiment, the integrity metric is acquired by the measurement function 31 by generating a digest of the BIOS instructions in the BIOS memory. Such an acquired integrity metric, if verified as described above, gives a potential user of the platform 10 a high level of 30 confidence that the platform 10 has not been subverted at a hardware, or BIOS program, level. Other known processes, for example virus checkers, will typically be in place to check that the operating system and application program code has not been subverted.

25

The measurement function 31 has access to: non-volatile memory 3 for storing a hash program 354 and a private key 355 of the trusted device 24, and volatile memory 4 for 35 storing acquired integrity metric in the form of a digest 361. In appropriate embodiments, the WO 00/48063 PCT/GB00/00528

volatile memory 4 may also be used to store the public keys and associated ID labels 360a-360n of one or more authentic smart cards 19s that can be used to gain access to the platform 10.

In one preferred implementation, as well as the digest, the integrity metric includes a Boolean value, which is stored in volatile memory 4 by the measurement function 31, for reasons that will become apparent.

A preferred process for acquiring an integrity metric will now be described with reference to Figure 4.

In step 500, at switch-on, the measurement function 31 monitors the activity of the main processor 21 on the data, control and address lines (26, 27 & 28) to determine whether the trusted device 24 is the first memory accessed. Under conventional operation, a main processor would first be directed to the BIOS memory first in order to execute the BIOS program. However, in accordance with the present embodiment, the main processor 21 is directed to the trusted device 24, which acts as a memory. In step 505, if the trusted device 24 is the first memory accessed, in step 510, the measurement function 31 writes to volatile memory 3 a Boolean value which indicates that the trusted device 24 was the first memory accessed. Otherwise, in step 515, the measurement function writes a Boolean value which indicates that the trusted device 24 was not the first memory accessed.

In the event the trusted device 24 is not the first accessed, there is of course a chance that the trusted device 24 will not be accessed at all. This would be the case, for example, if the main processor 21 were manipulated to run the BIOS program first. Under these circumstances, the platform would operate, but would be unable to verify its integrity on demand, since the integrity metric would not be available. Further, if the trusted device 24 were accessed after the BIOS program had been accessed, the Boolean value would clearly indicate lack of integrity of the platform.

In step 520, when (or if) accessed as a memory by the main processor 21, the main processor 21 reads the stored native hash instructions 354 from the measurement function .31 in step 525. The hash instructions 354 are passed for processing by the main processor 21 over the data bus 26. In step 530, main processor 21 executes the hash instructions 354 and uses them, in step 535, to compute a digest of the BIOS memory 29, by reading the contents of the BIOS memory 29 and processing those contents according to the hash program. In step 540, the main processor 21 writes the computed digest 361 to the appropriate non-volatile memory location 4 in the trusted device 24. The measurement function 31, in step 545, then calls the BIOS program in the BIOS memory 29, and execution 35 continues in a conventional manner.

Clearly, there are a number of different ways in which the integrity metric may be calculated, depending upon the scope of the trust required. The measurement of the BIOS program's integrity provides a fundamental check on the integrity of a platform's underlying processing environment. The integrity metric should be of such a form that it will enable reasoning about the validity of the boot process - the value of the integrity metric can be used to verify whether the platform booted using the correct BIOS. Optionally, individual functional blocks within the BIOS could have their own digest values, with an ensemble BIOS digest being a digest of these individual digests. This enables a policy to state which parts of BIOS operation are critical for an intended purpose, and which are irrelevant (in which case the individual digests must be stored in such a manner that validity of operation under the policy can be established).

Other integrity checks could involve establishing that various other devices, components or apparatus attached to the platform are present and in correct working order. In one example, the BIOS programs associated with a SCSI controller could be verified to ensure communications with peripheral equipment could be trusted. In another example, the integrity of other devices, for example memory devices or co-processors, on the platform could be verified by enacting fixed challenge/response interactions to ensure consistent results. Where the trusted device 24 is a separable component, some such form of interaction is desirable to provide an appropriate logical binding between the trusted device 14 and the platform. Also, although in the present embodiment the trusted device 24 utilises the data bus as its main means of communication with other parts of the platform, it would be feasible, although not so convenient, to provide alternative communications paths, such as hard-wired paths or optical paths. Further, although in the present embodiment the trusted device 24 instructs the main processor 21 to calculate the integrity metric in other embodiments, the trusted device itself is arranged to measure one or more integrity metrics.

Preferably, the BIOS boot process includes mechanisms to verify the integrity of the boot process itself. Such mechanisms are already known from, for example, Intel's draft "Wired for Management baseline specification v 2.0 - BOOT Integrity Service", and involve calculating digests of software or firmware before loading that software or firmware. Such a computed digest is compared with a value stored in a certificate provided by a trusted entity, whose public key is known to the BIOS. The software/firmware is then loaded only if the computed value matches the expected value from the certificate, and the certificate has been proven valid by use of the trusted entity's public key. Otherwise, an appropriate exception handling routine is invoked.

Optionally, after receiving the computed BIOS digest, the trusted device 24 may inspect the proper value of the BIOS digest in the certificate and not pass control to the BIOS if the computed digest does not match the proper value. Additionally, or alternatively, the trusted device 24 may inspect the Boolean value and not pass control back to the BIOS 5 if the trusted device 24 was not the first memory accessed. In either of these cases, an appropriate exception handling routine may be invoked.

Figure 5 illustrates the flow of actions by a TP, the trusted device 24 incorporated into a platform, and a user (of a remote platform) who wants to verify the integrity of the trusted platform. It will be appreciated that substantially the same steps as are depicted in Figure 5 10 are involved when the user is a local user. In either case, the user would typically rely on some form of software application to enact the verification. It would be possible to run the software application on the remote platform or the trusted platform. However, there is a chance that, even on the remote platform, the software application could be subverted in some way. Therefore, it is anticipated that, for a high level of integrity, the software 15 application would reside on a smart card of the user, who would insert the smart card into an appropriate reader for the purposes of verification. Figure 5 illustrates the flow of actions for the general case - a more specific flow of actions for verification by a user smart card will be described with reference to Figure 6 further below.

At the first instance, a TP, which vouches for trusted platforms, will inspect the type 20 of the platform to decide whether to vouch for it or not. This will be a matter of policy. If all is well, in step 600, the TP measures the value of integrity metric of the platform. Then, the TP generates a certificate, in step 605, for the platform. The certificate is generated by the TP by appending the trusted device's public key, and optionally its ID label, to the measured integrity metric, and signing the string with the TP's private key.

25

The trusted device 24 can subsequently prove its identity by using its private key to process some input data received from the user and produce output data, such that the input/output pair is statistically impossible to produce without knowledge of the private key. Hence, knowledge of the private key forms the basis of identity in this case. Clearly, it would be feasible to use symmetric encryption to form the basis of identity. However, the 30 disadvantage of using symmetric encryption is that the user would need to share his secret with the trusted device. Further, as a result of the need to share the secret with the user, while symmetric encryption would in principle be sufficient to prove identity to the user, it would insufficient to prove identity to a third party, who could not be entirely sure the verification originated from the trusted device or the user.

In step 610, the trusted device 24 is initialised by writing the certificate 350 into the appropriate non-volatile memory locations 3 of the trusted device 24. This is done. preferably, by secure communication with the trusted device 24 after it is installed in the motherboard 20. The method of writing the certificate to the trusted device 24 is analogous 5 to the method used to initialise smart cards by writing private keys thereto. The secure communications is supported by a 'master key', known only to the TP, that is written to the trusted device (or smart card) during manufacture, and used to enable the writing of data to the trusted device 24; writing of data to the trusted device 24 without knowledge of the master key is not possible.

10 At some later point during operation of the platform, for example when it is switched on or reset, in step 615, the trusted device 24 acquires and stores the integrity metric 361 of the platform.

When a user wishes to communicate with the platform, in step 620, he creates a nonce, such as a random number, and, in step 625, challenges the trusted device 24 (the 15 operating system of the platform, or an appropriate software application, is arranged to recognise the challenge and pass it to the trusted device 24, typically via a BIOS-type call, in an appropriate fashion). The nonce is used to protect the user from deception caused by replay of old but genuine signatures (called a 'replay attack') by untrustworthy platforms. The process of providing a nonce and verifying the response is an example of the well-20 known 'challenge/response' process.

In step 630, the trusted device 24 receives the challenge and creates an appropriate response. This may be a digest of the measured integrity metric and the nonce, and optionally its ID label. Then, in step 635, the trusted device 24 signs the digest, using its private key, and returns the signed digest, accompanied by the certificate 350, to the user.

In step 640, the user receives the challenge response and verifies the certificate using the well known public key of the TP. The user then, in step 650, extracts the trusted device's 24 public key from the certificate and uses it to decrypt the signed digest from the challenge response. Then, in step 660, the user verifies the nonce inside the challenge response. Next, in step 670, the user compares the computed integrity metric, which it 30 extracts from the challenge response, with the proper platform integrity metric, which it extracts from the certificate. If any of the foregoing verification steps fails, in steps 645, 655, 665 or 675, the whole process ends in step 680 with no further communications taking place.

Assuming all is well, in steps 685 and 690, the user and the trusted platform use other protocols to set up secure communications for other data, where the data from the 35 platform is preferably signed by the trusted device 24.

25

Further refinements of this verification process are possible. It is desirable that the challenger becomes aware, through the challenge, both of the value of the platform integrity metric and also of the method by which it was obtained. Both these pieces of information are desirable to allow the challenger to make a proper decision about the integrity of the 5 platform. The challenger also has many different options available - it may accept that the integrity metric is recognised as valid in the trusted device 24, or may alternatively only accept that the platform has the relevant level of integrity if the value of the integrity metric is equal to a value held by the challenger (or may hold there to be different levels of trust in these two cases).

The techniques of signing, using certificates, and challenge/response, and using them to prove identity, are well known to those skilled in the art of security and therefore need not be described in any more detail herein.

As indicated above, Figure 6 shows the flow of actions in an example of verification of platform integrity by a user interacting with the trusted platform with a smart card 19. As 15 will be described, the process conveniently implements a challenge/response routine. There exist many available challenge/response mechanisms. The implementation of an authentication protocol used in the present embodiment is mutual (or 3-step) authentication, as described in ISO/IEC 9798-3, "Information technology - Security techniques - Entity authentication mechanisms; Part 3; Entity authentication using a public key algorithm". 20 International Organization for Standardization, November 1993. Of course, there is no reason why other authentication procedures cannot be used, for example 2-step or 4-step, as also described in this reference.

Initially, the user inserts their smart card 19 into the smart card reader 12 of the platform in step 700.

Beforehand, a platform configured for use by users of in this way will typically be operating under the control of its standard operating system and executing the authentication process, which waits for a user to insert their smart card 19. Apart from the smart card reader 12 being active in this way, such a platform is typically rendered inaccessible to users by 'locking' the user interface (i.e. the screen, keyboard and mouse). 30 This will however not be the case in all embodiments of the invention.

When the smart card 19 is inserted into the smart card reader 12, the trusted device 24 is triggered to attempt mutual authentication in step by generating and transmitting a nonce A to the smart card 19 in step 705. A nonce, such as a random number, is used to protect the originator from deception caused by replay of old but genuine responses (called 35 a 'replay attack') by untrustworthy third parties.

In response, in step 710, the smart card 19 generates and returns a response comprising the concatenation of: the plain text of the nonce A, a new nonce B generated by the smart card 19, an ID of the trusted device 24 and some redundancy; the signature of the plain text, generated by signing the plain text with the private key of the smart card 19; and a 5 certificate containing the ID and the public key of the smart card 19.

The trusted device 24 authenticates the response by using the public key in the certificate to verify the signature of the plain text in step 715. If the response is not authentic, the process ends in step 720. If the response is authentic, in step 725 the trusted device 24 generates and sends a further response including the concatenation of: the plain text of the nonce A, the nonce B, an ID of the smart card 19 and the acquired integrity metric; the signature of the plain text, generated by signing the plain text using the private key of the trusted device 24; and the certificate comprising the public key of the trusted device 24 and the authentic integrity metric, both signed by the private key of the TP.

The smart card 19 authenticates this response by using the public key of the TP and comparing the acquired integrity metric with the authentic integrity metric, where a match indicates successful verification, in step 730. If the further response is not authentic, the process ends in step 735.

If the procedure is successful, both the trusted device 24 has authenticated the logon card 19 and the smart card 19 has verified the integrity of the trusted platform and, in step 20 740, the authentication process executes the secure process for the user.

In certain types of interaction, the authentication process can end at this point. However, if a session is to be continued between the user and the trusted platform, it is desirable to ensure that the user remains authenticated to the platform.

Where continued authentication is required, the authentication process sets an interval timer in step 745. Thereafter, using appropriate operating system interrupt routines, the authentication process services the interval timer periodically to detect when the timer meets or exceeds a pre-determined timeout period in step 750.

Clearly, the authentication process and the interval timer run in parallel with the secure process. When the timeout period is met or exceeded, the authentication process triggers the trusted device 24 to re-authenticate the smart card 19, by transmitting a challenge for the smart card 19 to identify itself in step 760. The smart card 19 returns a certificate including its ID and its public key in step 765. In step 770, if there is no response (for example, as a result of the smart card 19 having been removed) or the certificate is no longer valid for some reason (for example, the smart card has been replaced with a different

WO 00/48063 PCT/GB00/00528

smart card), the session is terminated by the trusted device 24 in step 775. Otherwise, in step 770, the process from step 745 repeats by resetting the interval timer.

Additionally, or alternatively, in some embodiments it may be required that the user profile is encrypted and signed to protect privacy and integrity. If so, a secure data transfer 5 protocol may be needed between the trusted device 24 and the smart card 19. There exist many available mechanisms for transferring secure credentials between two entities. A possible implementation, which may be used in the present embodiment, is secure key transport mechanisms from ISO/IEC DIS 11770-3, "Information technology – Security techniques – Key management - Part 3: Mechanisms using asymmetric techniques", 10 International Organization for Standardization, March 1997.

Modifications of this verification process using other well-known challenge and response techniques can easily be achieved by the skilled person. Similarly, alternative verification processes can be used by parties interacting with the platform in a different manner (that is, other than as a user equipped with a smart card).

CLAIMS

Computing apparatus comprising mounted on an assembly main processing means and
 main memory means, each being connected for communication with one or more other components on the assembly,

characterised by further comprising a trusted device mounted on the assembly and being connected for communications with one or more other components on the assembly, the trusted device being arranged to acquire a true value of an integrity metric of the computing apparatus.

2. Computing apparatus according to claim 1, wherein the trusted device comprises device memory means and means for instructing the main processing means to determine the integrity metric and return the integrity metric for storage in the device memory means.

15

3. Computing apparatus according to claim 2, wherein the means for instructing the main processing means comprises, stored in the device memory means, program code native to the main processing means, and the trusted device is arranged to transfer the instructions of the program code to the main processing means.

- 4. Computing apparatus according to claim 3, wherein the platform is arranged to cause the instructions to be the first instructions executed after release from reset.
- Computing apparatus according to claim 3 or claim 4, wherein the trusted device is
 arranged to transfer the instructions to the main processing means in response to memory read signals from the main processing means.
- 6. Computing apparatus according to any one of claims 1 to 5, wherein the trusted device comprises device memory means and is arranged to monitor the data bus means and store in the device memory means a flag in the event the first memory read signals generated by the main processing means after the computing apparatus is released from reset are addressed to the trusted device.

7. Computing apparatus according to any one of claims 1 to 6, wherein the trusted device has stored in device memory means at least one of:

a unique identity of the trusted device;

an authenticated integrity metric generated by a trusted party; and

5 a secret.

- 8. Computing apparatus according to claim 7, wherein the trusted device has stored in device memory means a secret comprising a private asymmetric encryption key.
- 9. Computing apparatus according to claim 8, wherein the trusted device also has stored in device memory means a respective public encryption key that has been signed by a trusted party.
- 10. Computing apparatus according to claim 8 or claim 9, wherein the trusted device has stored in device memory means an authenticated integrity metric generated by a trusted party and includes a encryption function, the trusted device being arranged to generate a response to a received challenge, the response comprising an acquired integrity metric and the authenticated integrity metric, both signed by the encryption function using the private asymmetric encryption key.

20

- 11. A trusted device configured for use in computing apparatus according to any one of the preceding claims.
- 12. A method of operating a system comprising trusted computing apparatus and a user, the trusted computing apparatus incorporating a trusted device being arranged to acquire the true value of an integrity metric of the computing apparatus, the method comprising the steps of:

the trusted device acquiring the true value of the integrity metric of the trusted computing apparatus;

30 the user generating a challenge for the trusted computing apparatus to prove its integrity and submitting the challenge to the trusted computing apparatus;

the trusted computing apparatus receiving the challenge, and the trusted device generating a response including the integrity metric and returning the response to the user; and

WO 00/48063 PCT/GB00/00528

the user receiving the response, extracting the integrity metric from the response and comparing the integrity metric with an authenticated metric for the trusted computing apparatus that had been generated by a trusted party.

- 5 13. A method according to claim 12, wherein the challenge includes a nonce, the response includes the integrity metric and the nonce, both digitally signed by the trusted device using a information security algorithm, and the user verifies the integrity metric and the nonce using a respective information security algorithm.
- 10 14. A method according to claim 13, wherein the trusted device uses a private encryption key to sign the integrity metric and the nonce, and the user uses the respective public encryption key to verify the integrity metric and the nonce.
- 15. A method according to claim 14, wherein the response includes a certificate held by the trusted device, which certificate has been digitally signed by a trusted party using a private encryption key of the trusted party, the certificate including the public encryption key of the trusted device, and the user verifies the certificate using the public encryption key of the trusted party and uses the public encryption key from the certificate to verify the integrity metric and the nonce.

- 16. A method of establishing a communications channel in a system between trusted computing apparatus and remote computing apparatus, the method including the step of the remote computing apparatus verifying the integrity of the trusted computing apparatus using the method according to any one of claims 12 to 15, and maintaining the communications channel for further transactions in the event the integrity of the trusted computing apparatus is successfully verified by the remote computing apparatus.
- 17. A method of verifying that trusted computing apparatus is trustworthy for use by a user for processing a particular application, the method including the step of the user verifying the integrity of the trusted computing apparatus using the method according to any one of claims 12 to 15, and the user using the trusted computing apparatus to process the particular application in the event the integrity of the trusted computing apparatus is successfully verified by the remote computing apparatus.

- 18. Trusted computing apparatus adapted for use in accordance with the method of any one of claims 12 to 17.
- 19. Remote computing apparatus arranged for use in accordance with claim 16.
- 20. A trusted device arranged for use in accordance with any one of claims 12 to 17.
- 21. Computing apparatus configured to receive a trusted device as claimed in claim 11.

1/5








FIGURE 1






WO 00/48063 PCT/GB00/00528





WO 00/48063 PCT/GB00/00528





A. CLASSIFICATION OF SUBJECT MATTER IPC 7 G06F1/00 G06F G06F12/14 According to International Patent Classification (IPC) or to both national classification and IPC B. FIELDS SEARCHED Minimum documentation searched (classification system followed by classification symbols) IPC 7 GO6F Documentation searched other than minimum documentation to the extent that such documents are included in the fields searched Bectronic data base consulted during the international search (name of data base and, where practical, search terms used) C. DOCUMENTS CONSIDERED TO BE RELEVANT Citation of document, with indication, where appropriate, of the relevant passages Relevant to claim No. X WO 98 15082 A (INTEL CORP) 1-4,7, 9 April 1998 (1998-04-09) 11,21 the whole document 5,8-10, 12-15 EP 0 849 657 A (NCR INT INC) 1,2,7 24 June 1998 (1998-06-24) the whole document 10 -/--X Further documents are listed in the continuation of box C. \mathbf{x} Patent family members are listed in annex. Special categories of cited documents: "I" later document published after the international filing date or priority date and not in conflict with the application but cited to understand the principle or theory underlying the "A" document defining the general state of the art which is not considered to be of particular relevance invention "E" earlier document but published on or after the international "X" document of particular relevance; the claimed invention cannot be considered novel or cannot be considered to filing date "L" document which may throw doubts on priority claim(s) or which is cited to establish the publication date of another chation or other special reason (as specified) involve an inventive step when the document is taken alone "Y" document of particular relevance; the cislmed invention cannot be considered to Involve an inventive step when the document is combined with one or more other such documents, such combination being obvious to a person skilled "O" document referring to an oral disclosure, use, exhibition or other means "P" document published prior to the international filing date but later than the priority date claimed "&" document member of the same patent family Date of the actual completion of the international search Date of mailing of the international search report 30 March 2000 06/04/2000 Name and mailing address of the ISA Authorized officer European Patent Office, P.B. 5818 Patentiaan 2 NL – 2280 HV Rijswijk Tel. (+31-70) 340-2040, Tx. 31 851 epo ni, Fax: (+31-70) 340-3018 Powell, D

1



Inter Application No
PCT/GB 00/00528

	DOCUMENTS CONSIDERATE TO DE CO	PCT/GB 00/00528
ategory *	ation) DOCUMENTS CONSIDERED TO BE RELEVANT Citation of document, with indication, where appropriate, of the relevant passages	Relevant to daim No.
Α	WO 95 24696 A (INTEGRATED TECH AMERICA ; MOONEY DAVID M (US); WOOD DAVID E (US); K) 14 September 1995 (1995-09-14) abstract; figure 3 page 3, paragraph 3 page 9, paragraph 2 - paragraph 3 page 12, paragraph 3 -page 13, paragraph 1 page 19, last paragraph -page 20, paragraph 1 page 21, paragraph 1 -page 22, paragraph 1 page 27, paragraph 2 -page 28, paragraph 1 claims 4,16	1,2,4, 6-8,10
١	US 5 680 547 A (CHANG STEVE MING-JANG) 21 October 1997 (1997-10-21) the whole document	16,19
A	EP 0 510 244 A (ACER INC) 28 October 1992 (1992-10-28)	
		·

1



information on patent family members

PCT/GB 00/00528

Patent document cited in search repo	nt	Publication date	Patent family member(s)		Publication date	
WO 9815082	Α	09-04-1998	US	5844986 A	01-12-1998	
			AU	4146197 A	24-04-1998	
			CN	1231787 A	13-10-1999	
			EP	0932953 A	04-08-1999	
EP 0849657	A	24-06-1998	JP	10282884 A	23-10-1998	
WO 9524696	A	14-09-1995	US	5610981 A	11-03-1997	
			AT	175505 T	15-01-1999	
			AU	703856 B	01-04-1999	
			ΑU	2092695 A	25-09-1995	
			BR	9506968 A	01-06-1999	
			CA	2183759 A	14-09-1995	
			CN	1146813 A	02-04-1997	
			DE	69507129 D	18-02-1999	
			DE	69507129 T	05-08-1999	
			EP	0748474 A	18-12-1996	
			NZ	282954 A	24-11-1997	
US 5680547	Α	21-10-1997	US	5444850 A	22-08-1995	
			AU	1042895 A	15-05-1996	
			JP	10511783 T	10-11-1998	
			MO	9613002 A	02-05-1996	
EP 0510244	A	28-10-1992	JP	6348486 A	22-12-1994	
			US	5511184 A	23-04-1996	


INTERNATIONAL SEARCH REPORT

initial Application No GB 00/00528

A CHARC	SECATION OF SUBJECT MATTER						
ÎPC 7	A. CLASSIFICATION OF SUBJECT MATTER IPC 7 G06F1/00 G06F12/14						
	to International Patent Classification (IPC) or to both national classifi	fication and IPC					
4.4	S SEARCHED						
IPC 7	ocumentation searched (classification system followed by classifica GOSF						
	ation searched other than minimum documentation to the extent that						
	data base consulted during the International search (name of data bi	ase and, where practical, search terms used	<u>,</u>				
Category *			T				
Category	Citation of document, with indication, where appropriate, of the re	Hevant passages	Relevant to claim No.				
X	WO 98 15082 A (INTEL CORP) 9 April 1998 (1998-04-09) the whole document		1-4,7, 11,21				
Α		∵	5,8-10, 12-15				
X	EP 0 849 657 A (NCR INT INC) 24 June 1998 (1998-06-24) the whole document		1,2,7				
A			10				
l l		-/	l				
	her documents are listed in the continuation of box C.	Patent family members are listed in	in annex.				
*Special categories of cited documents: *A' document defining the general state of the art which is not considered to be of patitionary reconsidered to the patitionary reconsidered to find the patitionary reconsidered and reconsidered to find the patition reconsidered to find the patitionary reconsidered and reconsidered r							
"P" document later the	neans of published prior to the international filling date but	merms, such complitation being obvious in the art. *&* document member of the same patent for	as to a person skilled tamily				
	D March 2000	Date of maling of the international sear	rch report				
	nalling eddress of the ISA	Authorized officer					
	European Patent Ciffoe, P.B. 5818 Patentiaan 2 NL - 2280 HV Rijswijk Tel. (+31-70) 340-2040, Tx. 31 651 epo nl,	Powell D					

1

INTERNATIONAL SEARCH REPORT



		GB 00/00528
	ation) DOCUMENTS CONSIDERED TO BE RELEVANT	
* viogete	Citation of document, with indication, where appropriate, of the relevant passages	Relevant to claim No.
A	WO 95 24696 A (INTEGRATED TECH AMERICA ;MOONEY DAVID M (US); WOOD DAVID E (US); K) 14 September 1995 (1995-09-14) abstract; figure 3 page 3, paragraph 3 page 9, paragraph 2 - paragraph 3 page 12, paragraph 3 -page 13, paragraph 1 page 19, last paragraph -page 20, paragraph 1 page 21, paragraph 1 -page 22, paragraph 2 page 27, paragraph 2 -page 28, paragraph 1 claims 4,16	1,2,4, 6-8,10
	US 5 680 547 A (CHANG STEVE MING-JANG) 21 October 1997 (1997-10-21) the whole document	16,19
A	EP 0 510 244 A (ACER INC) 28 October 1992 (1992–10–28)	
	÷	
		1

INTERNATIONAL SEARCH REPORT

nfo

11.4

GB 00/00528

	ent document n search report		Publication date		Patent family member(s)	Publication date
WO 9	9815082	Α	09-04-1998	US	5844986 A	01-12-1998
				AU	4146197 A	24-04-1998
				CN	1231787 A	13-10-1999
		<u>.</u>		EP	0932953 A	04-08-1999
EP C	849657	A	24-06-1998	JP	10282884 A	23-10-1998
WO 9	524696	A	14-09-1995	US	5610981 A	11-03-1997
				AT	175505 T	15-01-1999
				AU	703856 B	01-04-1999
				AU	2092695 A	25-09-1995
				BR	9506968 A	01-06-1999
				CA	2183759 A	14-09-1995
				CN	1146813 A	02-04-1997
				DE	69507129 D	18-02-1999
				DE	69507129 T	05-08-1999
				EP	0748474 A	18-12-1996
				NZ	282954 A	24-11-1997
US 5	680547	A	21-10-1997	US	5444850 A	22-08-1995
	-			AU	1042895 A	15-05-1996
				JP	10511783 T	10-11-1998
				MO	9613002 A	02-05-1996
EP 0	510244	A	28-10-1992	JP	6348486 A	22-12-1994
				US	5511184 A	23-04-1996

INTERNATIONAL PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION REPORT

International application No. PCT/GB00/00528

ı.	Bas	is f the rep rt							
1.	the and	With regard to the elements of the international application (Replacement sheets which have been furnished to the receiving Office in response to an invitation under Article 14 are referred to in this report as "originally filed" and are not annexed to this report since they do not contain amendments (Rules 70.16 and 70.17)): Description, pages:							
	1-14		as originally filed						
	Clai	Claims, No.:							
	1-21		as originally filed						
	Drawings, sheets:								
	1-5		as originally filed						
2.		With regard to the language , all the elements marked above were available or furnished to this Authority in the anguage in which the international application was filed, unless otherwise indicated under this item.							
	These elements were available or furnished to this Authority in the following language: , which is:								
		the language of a translation furnished for the purposes of the international search (under Rule 23.1(b)).							
		the language of publication of the international application (under Rule 48.3(b)).							
		the language of a 55.2 and/or 55.3).	translation furnished for the purposes of international preliminary examination (under Rule						
3.	With regard to any nucleotide and/or amino acid sequence disclosed in the international application, the international preliminary examination was carried out on the basis of the sequence listing:								
		contained in the international application in written form.							
		filed together with the international application in computer readable form.							
		furnished subsequently to this Authority in written form.							
		furnished subsequently to this Authority in computer readable form.							
		The statement that the subsequently furnished written sequence listing does not go beyond the disclosure in the international application as filed has been furnished.							
		The statement that the information recorded in computer readable form is identical to the written sequence listing has been furnished.							
4.	The	amendments have	resulted in the cancellation of:						
		the description,	pages:						
		the claims,	Nos.:						

)

INTERNATIONAL PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION REPORT

the drawings, sheets: 5. This report has been established as if (some of) the amendments had not been made, since they have been considered to go beyond the disclosure as filed (Rule 70.2(c)): (Any replacement sheet containing such amendments must be referred to under item 1 and annexed to this report.) 6. Additional observations, if necessary: V. Reasoned statement under Article 35(2) with regard to novelty, inventive step or industrial applicability; citations and explanations supporting such statement 1. Statement Claims 2-21 Novelty (N) Yes: Claims 1 No: Inventive step (IS) Yes: Claims 12-21 No: Claims 2-11 Industrial applicability (IA) Yes: Claims 1-21 No: Claims

International application No. PCT/GB00/00528

2. Citations and explanations see separate sheet

VII. Certain defects in the international application

The following defects in the form or contents of the international application have been noted: see separate sheet

VIII. Certain observations on the international application

The following observations on the clarity of the claims, description, and drawings or on the question whether the claims are fully supported by the description, are made: see separate sheet

SECTION V

)

Reference is made to the following document:

D1: EP 0849657 A

Taking account to the following references to D1, the subject-matter of independent claim 1 so far as understood (see section VIII) is not new in the sense of Article 33(2) PCT because D1 discloses a

computing apparatus mounted on an assembly (see "data processing system" page 2 line 5 and Fig. 1) comprising main processing means (see "programmable central processing unit" page 2 line 5) and main memory means (see "memory" page 2 line 5), each being connected for communication with one or more other components on the assembly (see page 2 lines 45-46 and "processor data bus 17" in Fig. 1), characterised by further comprising a trusted device mounted on the assembly (see "security circuit 15" on page 2 line 44 and in Fig. 1) and being connected with one and more other components on the assembly (see page 2 lines 45-46 and "processor data bus 17" in Fig. 1), the trusted device being arranged to acquire a correct value of an integrity metric of the computing apparatus (see page 2 line 58 to page 3 line 1 and page 3 lines 5-15).

The "assembly" corresponds to a state-of-the-art motherboard where the system components are mounted on.

Independent claim 12 as understood under section VIII relates to a method for enforcing trust in a (remote) platform by proving its authenticity and integrity. It combines the well-known "challenge/response" process for authenticating the remote platform (see description page 11 lines 13-20) with digital signatures assuring the integrity of the (remote) platform. The verification of the integrity of the platform as disclosed in the present application differs from that of D1 (see D1 page 3 line 43 page 4 line 5) in that the first is invoked by a (remote) user and the latter is initiated at start-up time of the computing apparatus.

A combination of above authenticating and integrity verifying process is not obvious because the "challenge/response" process was not discussed in the documents cited

INTERNATIONAL PRELIMINARY **EXAMINATION REPORT - SEPARATE SHEET**

in the search report.

WO 9815082 discloses a method to authenticate and validate code updates. EP 0849657 discloses a method to verify the integrity of a computing platform at boot time.

In view of the above, the subject-matter of independent claim 12 is new and inventive (Art. 33(2) and (3) PCT).

- In the dependent claims 2-11 minor modifications to the system as defined in the respective head claims are set out, all of which, when not directly deducted from the teachings of the documents cited in the search report, relate to routine measures normally to be expected of the skilled person.
- Claims 13-21 are dependent on claim 12 and fulfill as well the requirements of Art. 33(2) and (3) PCT.

SECTION VII

)

- 1 "and lines 28" should read as "and address lines 28"; see also description page 7 line 2.
- 2 "non-volatile memory" on page 7 line 20 should have been provided by reference number 3 (and not 35).
- 3 "volatile memory" on page 8 lines 15-16 should have been provided by reference number 4 (and not 3).
- Step 520 "Device accessed?" in Fig. 4 should read as "Trusted Device (24) 4 accessed?".
- 5 "non-volatile memory location 4" page 8 line 33 should read as "volatile memory location 4".
- 6 "trusted device" on page 9 lines 19-20 should have been provided by reference

EXAMINATION REPORT - SEPARATE SHEET

number 24 (and not 14).

7 "data bus" on page 9 line 21 should have been provided by reference number 26.

SECTION VIII

)

- 1 The wording structure of claim 1 lines 1-2 is not clear. It appears that claim 1 should read as "computing apparatus mounted on an assembly comprising main processing means and main memory means (...)"
- 2 The term "true value" used in claim 1 line 9 and claim 12 lines 26 and 28 has no wellrecognised meaning and leaves the reader in doubt as to the meaning of the technical feature to which it refers, thereby rendering the definition of the subjectmatter of said claim unclear (Article 6 PCT). Its definition in the description on page 2 lines 9-12 is not sufficient since the scope of the invention is defined by the claims. Reading the claim on its own one would assume that "true value" refers to the digital representation of boolean true.

One way to overcome the objection would have been to replace "true value" by "correct value" or an expression the like. Such an amendment is allowable since it is disclosed within the application as originally filed (see description page 2 lines 9-12).

- 3 The features of the claims are not provided with reference signs placed in parentheses (Rule 6.2(b) PCT).
- 4 The terms "trusted computing apparatus" (used throughout claim 12) and "computing apparatus" (line 26 of claim 12) appear to define the same device. Thus both devices should be denoted identically, accordingly to Rule 10.2 PCT.
 - One way to overcome the objection would have been to replace "computing apparatus" in line 26 of claim 12 by "trusted computing apparatus".
- Line 24 of claim 12 should read "(...) comprising a trusted computing apparatus (...)". 5